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Aims of the paper
1. Investigate how far transaction costs economics (TCE) matter 
in the outsourcing decisions of firms
• characterized by ‘thick’ industrial relations (IR)
• embedded in a ‘typical’ local production system (LPS)
2. Acknowledge whether and how the delocalization choice of 
these firms correlates with their outsourcing decisions in the TCE-
IR-LPS framework
• NB: “Outsourcing” and “delocalization” are related, but not coincident
• Outsourcing: reducing the firm’s vertical scope by externalizing some 
activities, regardless of how and where this is done ► “organization and 
structure”
• Delocalization: externalizing through some direct investment, outside
the firm’s LPS ► “production and location”
Theoretical background I: “outsourcing”
1. “Combined” analysis of the firm’s vertical scope (e.g. Jacobides
and Winter, 2005; Nooteboom, 2004; Williamson, 1999)
• For outsourcing to occur specialization advantages (resource-
competence-based view) are required and should outweigh the 
costs of trading (transaction cost theory)
2. “Real time” analysis of the firm’s vertical scope (e.g. Argyres, 
1996, Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999; Langlois, 1992)
• The outsourcing firm is affected by the history of both its contracts 
(e.g. governance inseparability) and capabilities/competences 
(resource-complementarities, dynamic transaction costs)
3. “Contextual” (regional, local, …) analysis of the firm’s vertical 
scope (e.g. Taymaz and Kilicaslan, 2005; Clarke, 1994; Watanabe, 
1971) 
• The outsourcing firm is also and above all embedded in specific socio-
economic contexts, e.g. in local production systems (such as 
industrial districts), and is affected by its distinguishing features
Theoretical background II: “delocalization”
1. Delocalization, “international fragmentation of production” and costs
(e.g. Jones and Kierkowski, 2001; Deardorff, 2001)
• Integrated production activities get segmented across international networks providing 
extra coordination costs (e.g. transportation) are offset by lower production costs
(e.g. less production factors and factor price differential)
• Outsourcing and delocalization correlate positively: the search for 
production cost advantages spurs the conversion of fixed costs into variable 
ones through outsourcing
• … negatively: high international co-ordination costs spur firms not to 
disintegrate their organization to avoid further contractual costs 
2. Delocalization, “fragmentation of local production systems (LPS)” and 
capabilities/strategies (e.g., Belussi, 2006; Amighini and Rabellotti, 2005) 
• Geographic and cultural proximity affect delocalization and represent a competitive 
strategy for LPS (market segment positioning, value chains upgrading/downgrading)
• Outsourcing and delocalization correlate positively: the search for 
upgrading in high-level global value chains spurs the reliance on actual 
external providers
• … negatively: wider network of external relationships (delocalisation) might 
spur the LPS firm not to outsource given the pressure of industrial relations 
for a substitutive choice
Empirical background: 
the LPS of Reggio Emilia (Emilia Romagna)
• Reggio Emilia: a province which hosts a 
particular North-Eastern local production 
system (Brusco, 1982; Brusco and Solinas, 
1997; Pini, 2004; Seravalli, 2001)
 High density of SMEs
 Few strong production 
specializations (e.g. machinery for 
mechanical energy and agriculture, 
ceramic tales) 
 A considerable number of firms 
located in industrial districts, with 
quite standard features
 “Dense” industrial relations and 
participation of workers’ delegates to 
managerial decisions in work 
organization ► IR might interfere 
with TCE in accounting for OUT and 
DELOC
Tab.1 – Reggio Emilia: outsourcing firms of the sample and average outsourcing extent (OUT) by activity (2004) 
Outsourced activities Full sample 2004:  192 firms 
2004 sample 
portion of large 
firms (more than 
49 employees):  
134 firms 
2002-2004 matching 
sample (more than 49 
employess): 
 97 firms 
 % OUT (Average) % 
OUT 
(Average) % 
OUT 
(Average) 
Ancillary activities 54.76 1.185 56.18 1.183 53.00 1.119 
1.   Inventories management 17.19 0.240 20.15 0.284 19.00 0.260 
2.   Distribution, logistics and transports 58.85 1.167 60.45 1.172 54.00 1.040 
3.   Machinery maintenance 55.73 0.958 58.21 0.993 57.00 0.950 
4.   Plants maintenance 70.31 1.745 72.39 1.791 72.00 1.810 
5.   Cleaning services 76.56 1.922 82.09 2.060 79.00 2.010 
6.   Payroll management  68.23 1.641 64.93 1.470 57.00 1.300 
7.   Electronic data processing (EDP) 36.46 0.625 35.07 0.515 33.00 0.460 
Production supporting activities 20.77 0.320 20.71 0.313 18.57 0.277 
8.   Engineering 28.13 0.422 24.63 0.373 21.00 0.330 
9.   Research 22.92 0.349 22.39 0.328 18.00 0.250 
10. Development and testing procedures 23.44 0.318 23.88 0.313 20.00 0.260 
11. Human Resource Management (HRM) 9.90 0.135 10.45 0.134 10.00 0.120 
12. Quality control 13.54 0.188 11.94 0.149 12.00 0.140 
13. Sales 19.79 0.281 20.90 0.313 16.00 0.240 
14. Marketing 31.77 0.578 34.33 0.634 33.00 0.600 
15. Integrated information systems (ERP, SCM, CRM, …) 16.67 0.292 17.16 0.261 17.00 0.220 
Production activities 36.98 0.538 39.74 0.582 39.75 0.573 
16. Supply of intermediate products 63.02 0.979 66.42 1.000 65.00 0.910 
17. Specific production stages 37.50 0.458 37.31 0.455 37.00 0.440 
18. Specific products to be sold 30.73 0.464 35.07 0.552 36.00 0.610 
19. Specific trademarks 16.67 0.250 20.15 0.321 21.00 0.330 
Full average 36.71 0.685 37.78 0.690 35.63 0.646 
 
Empirical background:
outsourcing in Reggio Emilia
Empirical background:
delocalization in Reggio Emilia
Tab.2: Reggio Emilia: delocalizing firms and firms supporting exports with delocalization in the 
sample (2004)  
 
Full sample 2004: 
192 firms 
2004 sample portion 
of large firms (more 
than 49 employees): 
134 firms 
2002-2004 matching 
sample (more than 49 
employees): 
97 firms 
 
N. % N. % N. % 
Delocalization  
(FDI in production, regardless of exports) 33 17.19 27 20.15 19 19.59 
Export-supporting delocalization       
Foreign production units  29 15.10 26 19.40 19 19.59 
Foreign commercial business units 48 25.00 44 32.84 35 36.08 
Ownership participation to a foreign firm  26 13.54 24 17.91 18 18.56 
Agreement with a foreign network  109 56.77 82 61.19 61 62.89 
Others (trade fair, etc.) 46 23.96 34 25.37 26 26.80 
 
The econometric model:
structural form
yOUT_i,t outsourcing ‘output’ of firm i at time t
xTCE_i,t-1 variables related to TCE at time t-1
xIR_i,t-1 variables related to IR at time t-1
xDELOC_i,t-1 delocalization variables at time t-1
xSTRU_i,t-1 set of structural control variables for the LPS at time t-1
ei,t error term with usual properties
tiDELOCSTRIRTCEOUT tititititi xxxxy ,1,1,1,1,, ελδγβα +++++= −−−− [1]
The econometric model:
the variables
• Dependent variables: beyond simple dichotomic variables (“yes” or 
“not”)  
• 1) General outsourcing extent (OUTi): average extent at which firm i
externalises the n activities considered    
• OUTij extent at which firm i externalises the activity j: 0 (no externalized), 1(partially externalized), 2 (mainly externalized), 3 (totally externalized)
n
OUT
OUT
n
j
ij
i
∑
=
=
1
• 2) Specific outsourcing extent (OUTik): average extent at which firm i
externalises the activities of a certain kind k (k = ANC, PRODSUP, 
PROD)
The econometric model:
the variables
• Independent variables: standard proxies integrated with 
non standard and original ones
• 1) TCE variables: e.g. ASPEC and ASPECGOV
• 2) IR variables: e.g. INVOLV and INVOLV3
• 3) DELOC variables (dummies): e.g. DELOC and 
FOREPROD
• 4) LPS control variables: e.g. INNOPROD and 
HERFINNO 
The econometric model:
TCE variables
+
The econometric model:
IR variables – block I
i INVOLV Degree of involvement between managers and 
unions (workers delegates) on techno-
organisational changes 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing the 
intensity of involvement, from absence, to low 
involvement (information only), to medium 
involvement (consultation), to high (negotiation) 
ii INVOLV1 Involvement through information Dummy variable capturing the presence of 
information actions related to adoption of 
innovations 
iii INVOLV2 Involvement through consultation Dummy variable capturing the presence of 
consultation actions related to adoption of 
innovations 
iv INVOLV3 Involvement through negotiation Dummy variable capturing the presence of 
negotiation actions related to adoption of 
innovations 
v INDREL Degree of involvement between managers and 
unions (workers delegates) on 22 defined issues 
(employment, production, innovation, training, 
health, wages, etc..) 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing the 
increasing intensity of involvement: from absence, 
consultation, to negotiation 
vi MAN-EMPL Degree of involvement between managers and 
employees (workers delegates) on 22 defined 
issues (employment, production, innovation, 
training, health, wages, etc..) 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing the 
increasing intensity of involvement: from absence, 
consultation, to negotiation 
vii MAN-EMPL-
OUT 
Degree of involvement between managers and 
employees  on the outsourcing  issue  
Variable taking value 0,1,2 according to no 
involvement, consultation, negotiation 
 
The econometric model:
IR variables – block II
viii INV-INIT Manager initiatives to involve employees in 
production activities and/or problem solutions; 
 
 Workers’ participation to production decisions 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing the 
increasing intensity of participatory initiatives: from 
absence, to hierarchical ones, to teamworking, to 
joint committees, to more participatory pronounced 
actions 
ix BTC Bilateral manager-workers joint technical 
committees 
Dummy variable for the presence in the firm of 
bilateral joint technical committees for consultation 
and negotiation on selected issues 
x INNO-PART Consultation and delegation activities  in work 
organization 
Additive index built by synthesizing the intensity of 
introduction and presence of participation 
practices in work organization (see table 12, 
Antonioli et al., 2004) 
 
xi INNO-
ACTION 
Tecno-organisational and work changes 
introduced through the action of unions, joint 
committees or workers involvement 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing 13 
work and innovation changes introduced through 
the involvement of unions, joint committees or 
workers in 1998-2001 
xii INNO-
ACTION1 
Tecno-organisational and work changes 
introduced through the action of unions 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing 13 
work and innovation changes introduced through 
the involvement of unions, joint committees or 
workers in 1998-2001 
xiii INNO-
ACTION2 
Tecno-organisational and work changes 
introduced through the action of joint committees 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing 13 
work and innovation changes introduced through 
the involvement of unions, joint committees or 
workers in 1998-2001 
xiv INNO-
ACTION3 
Tecno-organisational and work changes 
introduced through the action of workers 
involvement 
Average Index ranging from 0 to 1 capturing 13 
work and innovation changes introduced through 
the involvement of unions, joint committees or 
workers in 1998-2001 
 
The econometric model:
DELOC variables
i DELOC International delocalization Foreign direct investments in production 
activities (d) 
ii FOREPROD Production delocalization for 
exports 
Foreign production units for supporting 
exports 
iii COM-UNIT Commercial delocalization for 
exports 
Foreign commercial/business unit for 
supporting exports (d) 
iv FOR-PART Foreign participation for exports Ownership participation to a foreign firm for 
supporting exports (d) 
v AGREEM Foreign agreements for exports Agreement with a foreign 
commercial/business network for supporting 
exports (d) 
(d) dummy variable 
The econometric model: CONTROL variables
 
STRUCTURAL VARIABLES 
i SIZE Size of the firm Number of employees (2004) 
ii MACH Machinery sector Firm belonging to machinery sector (d) 
iii CER Ceramic sector (non metal 
minerals) 
Firm belonging to ceramic sector (d) 
iv INTREV International market revenue 
(openness) 
Share of revenue in international markets 
v PRIV Private firm Private ownership (d), vs cooperative 
ownership, group membership 
vi TRAIN Training  Training Coverage 
vii SKILL Skill workforce content Ratio of skilled on unskilled workers 
 
INNOVATION VARIABLES 
viii INNOTECH Technological innovativeness Index of technological innovation 
averaging process, product and quality 
product innovations (1998-2001) 
ix INNOPROD Product innovation Product innovations (1998-2001) 
x INNOPROD Process innovation Process innovations (1998-2001) 
xi HERFREV Market concentration Herfindhal index of the sector’s revenues 
xii HERFINNO Innovation concentration Herfindhal of innovations 
xiii SPEARINNO Sectoral turbulence in 
innovation activites   
Spearman correlation in innovation 
rankings 
xiv INNOORG Organisational innovations Index averaging the adoption of five 
organizational practices ( TQM, QC, JIT, 
TW, TR) 
 
FLEXIBILITY VARIABLES 
xv FLEXREL Flexibility of labor relations see Antonioli et al. (2004) 
xvi FLEXINNO Firm flexibility synthetic index of flexibility indicators 
 
Empirical application I
• OLS estimate of model [1] on a Reggio Emilia dataset obtained by 
merging two datasets:
– Dataset I: direct survey carried out in 2002 (on 1998-2001); used for a 
first analysis of outsourcing driving forces (MM SM PP, 2006) 
– Dataset II: direct survey carried out in 2005 (on 2004)
• Several advantages (although at the price of a reduced number of 
observations)
i. Hybrid cross section framework: lags in the main outsourcing explanatory 
variables
ii. Pure cross-section endogeneity flaws are mitigated: outsourcing elicited in 
2004 (t), while the set of covariates in 2001 (t – 1) and in the period 1998-
2001
iii. International issues receive a first attention: unlike Dataset I, in Dataset II 
some delocalization aspects are elicited (NB: in [1], xDELOC,t rather than 
xDELOC,t-1)
iv. Statistical representativeness is preserved: sensible bias by size (small 
firms under-represented)
Empirical application II
• Dataset I
• Sample of 166 firms, with at least 50 employees: Reggio Emilia universe
amounts to 257 firms (Intermediate Census 1996 of the National Institute of Statistics 
and Camera di Commercio in Reggio Emilia 2001)
• Sampling procedure: matching 199 firms whose managers have been interviewed 
in a large 2002 survey on Reggio Emilia (reply ratio of 77.4%!!!), with those having 
balance sheets registered in Reggio Emilia Chamber of Commerce for the period 
1998-2001
• Reference period: 2001 and 1998-2001
• Representativeness of the sample
• 64.59% firms of the entire population
• limited bias in the firms’ distribution by sector and size: textile sector and small-size 
firms (50 to 99 employees) slightly under-represented
• no significant distortion in all other sectors and dimensional employees’ classes
• tolerable results in a Marbach Test (Cochran, 1977)
Empirical application III
• Dataset II
• Sample of 192 firms, with at least 20 employees, of which 134 with at least 50 
employees: Reggio Emilia universe amounts to 634 firms (Intermediate Census 
1996 of the National Institute of Statistics and Camera di Commercio in Reggio Emilia 
2001); all the 192 firms have trade unions delegates who responded to the 
questionnaire
• Reference period: 2004
• Representativeness of the sample
• 250 firms representative (sample) of the firms population with RSU (376)
• 76,8% responding firms of the sample of the population firms with RSU
• limited bias in the firms’ distribution by sector: mechanical sector slightly under-
represented
• sensible bias in the firms’ distribution by size: small firms (<50 employees) under-
represented given the low RSU presence
• tolerable results in a Marbach Test (Cochran, 1977)
Empirical application IV
• Merge of Dataset I and Dataset II
• 97 firms, with at least 50 employees: interviewed in 2002, in 
2005 and with balance sheets available
• Representativeness of the sample: 
• limited bias in the firms’ distribution by sector: textile sector 
slightly under-represented
• sensible bias in the firms’ distribution by size: small firms (50-
99 employees) under-represented given a  lower RSU 
presence
• tolerable results in a Marbach Test (Cochran, 1977)
Main results:
general outsourcing extent I
• 1) In general, TCE outsourcing 
predictions are only partially 
confirmed:
• specific assets discourage outsourcing 
(ASPEC) but the same holds true (less 
significantly) for administration costs 
(ORGHIER)
• uncertainty (MKTUNC) spurs, rather 
than inhibiting, outsourcing: 
governance inseparability matters 
more than post-contractual 
opportunism
Dependent variable: OUT 
Covariates 
Constant   1.940    
ASPEC     -2.208 **  
ORGHIER   -1.449   
MKTUNC     2.659 *** 
INV-INIT  -2.055 **   
DELOC      2.810 *** 
AGREEM    -1.871 * 
FOREPROD  -3.293 *** 
INNOPROD   3.097 *** 
HERFINNO   3.212 *** 
FLEXFUN    1.885 * 
SIZE      -2.129 ** 
MACH      -1.753 * 
CER       -2.731 *** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2194750     
F-test (prob)   3.08 (.0009) 
 
Main results:
general outsourcing extent II
• 2) IR do affect outsourcing 
decisions, and actually hamper it
• when they participate to operational 
and problem-solving decisions (INV-
INIT), workers fear and contrast 
outsourcing significantly
• the unions involvement in outsourcing 
decisions block them in front of 
specific assets (ASPECGOV (-) in 
another specific.) even when ASPEC
is not significantly perceived by the 
firm as problematic to contract out
Dependent variable: OUT 
Covariates 
Constant   1.940    
ASPEC     -2.208 **  
ORGHIER   -1.449   
MKTUNC     2.659 *** 
INV-INIT  -2.055 **   
DELOC      2.810 *** 
AGREEM    -1.871 * 
FOREPROD  -3.293 *** 
INNOPROD   3.097 *** 
HERFINNO   3.212 *** 
FLEXFUN    1.885 * 
SIZE      -2.129 ** 
MACH      -1.753 * 
CER       -2.731 *** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2194750     
F-test (prob)   3.08 (.0009) 
 
Main results:
general outsourcing extent III
• 3) Delocalization might call for 
outsourcing, … but only at certain 
conditions
• benefiting from lower production costs 
(DELOC) might require turning fixed 
into variable costs in general (OUT)
• … but establishing foreign production 
units (FOREPROD) and collaborate 
with foreign partners (AGREEM) to 
gain foreign market shares could be 
accepted by IR only at the price of 
lower outsourcing
Dependent variable: OUT 
Covariates 
Constant   1.940    
ASPEC     -2.208 **  
ORGHIER   -1.449   
MKTUNC     2.659 *** 
INV-INIT  -2.055 **   
DELOC      2.810 *** 
AGREEM    -1.871 * 
FOREPROD  -3.293 *** 
INNOPROD   3.097 *** 
HERFINNO   3.212 *** 
FLEXFUN    1.885 * 
SIZE      -2.129 ** 
MACH      -1.753 * 
CER       -2.731 *** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2194750     
F-test (prob)   3.08 (.0009) 
 
Main results:
general outsourcing extent IV
• 4) The “technological profile” of the 
LPS also matter for outsourcing
• outsourcing seem to favor production 
innovation by breaking competence 
traps (INNOPROD)
• outsourcing seems a necessary 
organizational innovation to 
accompany technological ones even in 
sectors characterized by a Schumpter
Mark II technological regime 
(HERFINNO)
Dependent variable: OUT 
Covariates 
Constant   1.940    
ASPEC     -2.208 **  
ORGHIER   -1.449   
MKTUNC     2.659 *** 
INV-INIT  -2.055 **   
DELOC      2.810 *** 
AGREEM    -1.871 * 
FOREPROD  -3.293 *** 
INNOPROD   3.097 *** 
HERFINNO   3.212 *** 
FLEXFUN    1.885 * 
SIZE      -2.129 ** 
MACH      -1.753 * 
CER       -2.731 *** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2194750     
F-test (prob)   3.08 (.0009) 
 
Main results:
general outsourcing extent V
• 5) The most industrial-district-like 
sectoral partition of the LPS 
outsources relatively less, but just 
for the larger firms
• sectoral dummies for machinery 
(MACH) and tiles (CER) are significant 
and with a negative sign
• … the same holds true for the size 
continuous variable (SIZE)
• ► outsourcing my threaten the 
cohesion of the districts, but only if 
it concerns their “champions”
Dependent variable: OUT 
Covariates 
Constant   1.940    
ASPEC     -2.208 **  
ORGHIER   -1.449   
MKTUNC     2.659 *** 
INV-INIT  -2.055 **   
DELOC      2.810 *** 
AGREEM    -1.871 * 
FOREPROD  -3.293 *** 
INNOPROD   3.097 *** 
HERFINNO   3.212 *** 
FLEXFUN    1.885 * 
SIZE      -2.129 ** 
MACH      -1.753 * 
CER       -2.731 *** 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2194750     
F-test (prob)   3.08 (.0009) 
 
Main results:
specific outsourcing extent
• Which kind of outsourcing are we talking of in RE? 
• Outsourcing of ancillary activities (OUTANC) fits the model relatively better than 
general outsourcing, and the reverse holds true for that of supporting-production 
(OUTPRODSUP) and production activities (OUTPROD) as such
Dependent variable: OUTANC Dependent variable: OUTPRODSUP Dependent variable: OUTPROD 
Covariates Covariates Covariates 
Constant  2.630 Constant    -1.394  Constant      2.128    
ASPEGOV  -5.091 *** ORGHIER     -3.008 *** MKTASPE     - 2.575 ** 
MKTUNC    3.948 *** MKTUNC       2.920 ORGHIER      -2.536 ** 
FIRMUNC  -2.510 ** FIRMUNC     -1.747 * AGE           1.282   
INVOL3   -3.310 *** INVINIT     -2.600 *** MAN-EMPL-OUT -2.018 **   
DELOC     2.134 ** BTC         -1.657 INNOPROD      2.763 *** 
AGREEM   -2.416 ** COM-UNIT     1.948 * HERFINNO      2.426 **  
FOREPROD -2.506 ** INNOTECH     1.904 * STRUCTORG     2.366 ** 
HERFINNO3 0.235 *** HERFINNO     2.452 ** SIZE         -0.775    
SKILL     1.572 FLEXFUN      2.397 ** MACH          0.126    
SIZE     -1.027 SUBFOR       1.435 CER          -0.991    
MACH     -1.777 * SIZE        -1.569   
CER      -3.901 *** MACH        -2.147 **  
 CER         -1.543  
Adj. R2   0.3038220 
F-test prob) 4.49 (.0000) 
Adj. R2      0.1633140 
F-test(prob)  2.44 (.0075) 
Adj. R2       0.1253886 
F-test(prob)  2.38 (.0155) 
 
1) OUTANC: (i) unions make the problems of outsourcing specific assets sensible 
and significant (ASPECGOV) even when they are not; (ii) firms in which 
organizational changes are “negotiated” (INVOL3) might be pushed  to trade 
outsourcing for other internal kind of changes; (iii) idiosyncratic (rather than 
sectoral) firm uncertainty returns to call for vertical integration (FIRMUNC) 
Main results:
specific outsourcing extent
2) OUTPRODSUP: (i) bilateral manager-workers joint technical committees (BTC) 
might be used to deal with (and contrast) outsourcing of more “important” activities; 
(ii) idiosyncratic (rather than sectoral) firm uncertainty returns to call for vertical 
integration (FIRMUNC);  (iii) delocalizing through a commercial/business unit (COM-
UNIT) might not require a “compensation” in terms of less outsourcing; (iv) the role 
of size (SIZE) becomes insignificant (also for OUTPROD) 
3) OUTPROD: (i) the typical TCE interaction between uncertainty and specificity
(MKTASPEC) becomes significant for “truly” production outsourcing; (ii) when 
managers and employees interact in the relative decision (MAN-EMPL-OUT) 
outsourcing might be hampered; (iii) on production activities, delocalization 
strategies and outsourcing seem to be run independently; (iv) time increases 
outsourcing experience rather than governance inseparability (AGE)
Conclusions I
1. The role of TCE in accounting for the RE firms’ outsourcing is 
blurred:
– the TCE binomium “asset specificity-with-uncertainty” works only for 
production activities
– in general, and for ancillary and production supporting activities, the 
significance of TCE arguments decreases, when it is not even 
contradicted
2. The role of IR in accounting for the RE firms’ outsourcing is 
quite straightforward:
– whenever involved in the decisional process, workers and/or workers 
delegates are able to counteract it
– the “IR tool” through which they contrast outsourcing is the more formal 
and participatory, the more “important” is the outsourced activity
– unions seem to play a role in signaling the post-contractual problems of 
contracting out specific assets 
Conclusions II
3. In general, RE firms use outsourcing and international delocalization 
in a complementary way
– a “disintegrated” organizational structure appears more favorable to benefit 
from the cost and competitive advantages of delocalizing
4. However, when delocalization is used to penetrate foreign markets, 
outsourcing appears to be used substitutively
– extra-coordination costs might counteract the savings in production costs
– unions and worker delegates (consider result 2) might want to use the two 
instruments as substitutive bargaining tools
5. The correlation between outsourcing and delocalization is “activity-
dependent”
– delocalizing through a commercial/business unit, rather than a production unit 
as such, might not require a “compensation” in terms of less outsourcing
– on production activities, delocalization strategies and outsourcing seem to be 
run independently
Conclusions III
6. The technological profile of RE firms matter in accounting for 
their outsourcing decisions
– their technological innovativeness (mainly product innovations) 
correlates positively with outsourcing, even at the risk of knowledge 
leakage
7. The most industrial-district-like sectoral partition of the LPS 
outsources relatively less, with different insights in terms of 
firm size 
– outsourcing my threaten the cohesion of the districts
– in the case of ancillary activities, and in general, providing outsourcing 
is made by the district largest firms (“champions”)
Research agenda
• Directions along which to make the results more robust:
1. Gathering information about the nationality of the outsourcer 
(national vs. international outsourcing)
2. Refining the analysis of delocalization strategies by retaining the 
organizational structure of the firms (national vs. multinational 
corporations)   
3. Extending the analysis to a broader sample of firms, possibly also 
for other Emilia-Romagna provinces
